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Out of the Sunshine
and into the Shadows: Six Years
of Misinterpretation
of the Personal Privacy Exemption
of the Kentucky Open Records Act
INTRODUCTION
By passing the Kentucky Open Records Act1 (Act) in 1976,
the General Assembly placed Kentucky among the great number
of states which have recognized the importance of permitting
public access to government records.2 As the Act's preamble
states, this right of access is a "fundamental and necessary right
of every citizen in the Commonwealth of Kentucky."'3 However,
it is not absolute. Although the legislature recognized "that free
and open examination of public records is in the public
interest,"4 it joined other states in recognizing the legitimate
need to exclude certain records from public scrutiny,5 particular-
ly where release might result in an invasion of privacy. 6 To this
end, Kentucky Revised Statutes (KRS) section 61.878(1) (a) excludes
from the Act's application "[p]ublic records containing informa-
tion of a personal nature where the public disclosure thereof would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 7
This standard-the clearly unwarranted invasion-and the
complex balancing of interests involved in its proper application
are the subject of this Note. Kentucky has not yet had the benefit
I Open Records Act, ch. 273, §§ 1-10, 1976 Ky. Acts 567 (codified at KY. REv. STAT.
§§ 61.870-.884 (Bobbs-Merrill 1980) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
2 See R. BoucARuD & J. FaNKLIN, GUIDEBOOK TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION
AND PRIVACY AcTs 265-434, app. C (1980 & Supp. 1982).
3 Open Records Act, ch. 273, preamble, 1976 Ky. Acts 567.
4 KRS § 61.882(4) (1980).
5 See R. BoucHARD & J. FRANKLIN, supra note 2, at 265 app. C.
6 E.g., CAL. Gov-r. CODE § 6254 (West Supp. 1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-19
(West Cum. Supp. 1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10002(d) (1979 & Cum. Supp. 1982);
GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-72 (1982); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAw § 89 (McKinney Cum. Supp.
1982); W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-4 (1980).
7 KRS § 61.878(i)(a) (1980) (emphasis added).
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of a thorough exploration of the conflict between the "public's right
to governmental information ' and its citizens' right to privacy.
Other than a single judicial opinion9 and one scholarly article, 0
the only sources of interpretation are the many written opinions
of the Commonwealth's Attorney General." Statute requires
these opinions to be issued at the request of persons denied
8 SENATE REPORT ON THE FOIA, S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT].
9 Ex parte Farley, 570 S.W.2d 617 (Ky. 1978). The subject of this Note does not
involve Farley. The decision's only relevance to the Open Records Act comes from the
Kentucky Supreme Court's refusal to adhere to certain sections of the Act, specifically
KRS §§ 61.880, .878(2), because they impede the conduct of the Court's business. See 570
S.W.2d at 625.
10 Ziegler, The Kentucky Open Records Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 7 N. KY. L.
REv. 7, 14-16 (1980). Ziegler's work tends to be more explanatory than analytical and
therefore is best suited for background reading. For a more exhaustive analysis, see the
many excellent books and articles published on the federal Freedom of Information Act's
(FOIA) personal privacy exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976). See, e.g., J. O'REILLY,
FEDERAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: PROCEDURES, FORMS, AND THE LAW 16.01 to .14
(1978); PROJECT ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND CIVIL LIBERTIES, AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION FOUNDATION, LITIGATION UNDER THE AMENDED FEDERAL FREEDOM OF INFORMA-
TION ACT 44-52 (C. Marwick 2d ed. 1977); Note, The Freedom of Information Act: A
Seven Year Assessment, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 895, 954-56 (1974); Note, Invasion of Privacy
and the Freedom of Information Act: Getman v. NLRB, 40 CEO. WASH. L. REv. 527
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Invasion of Privacy].
11 E.g., 81 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 159 (Apr. 2, 1981) (library circulation records); 80
Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 88 (Feb. 7, 1980) (unpublished syllabus opinion on tax records); 79
Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 469 (Aug. 31, 1979) (salary of public employee); 79 Ky. Op. Att'y
Gen. 388 (July 10, 1979) (unpublished syllabus opinion on applications for grants under
community development block grant); 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 348 (June 7, 1979) (anonymous
teacher evaluation); 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 275 (Mar. 27, 1979) (unpublished analysis
of KRS § 61.878(1) (1980)); 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 128 (Feb. 20, 1979) (unpublished opi-
nion on police chief candidate interview); 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 58 (Jan. 29, 1979) (un-
published opinion on results of hairdressing exam); 78 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 626 (Sept. 6,
1978) (unpublished opinion on mayor's appointment book); 78 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 468
(July 11, 1978) (exam papers and test scores); 78 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 382 (June 1, 1978)
(unpublished opinion on job applicant's test scores); 78 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 231 (Apr. 4,
1978) (unpublished opinion on position and salary of public employees); 78 Ky. Op. Att'y
Gen. 133 (Feb. 17, 1978) (KRS § 61.878(1) (a) does not apply to matters of public employ-
ment); 77 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 726 (Oct. 19, 1977) (unpublished opinion on staff budget,
job description and salary); 77 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 723 (Nov. 15, 1977) (unpublished opin-
ion on salary of city employees); 77 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 585 (Sept. 21, 1977) (health in-
spection records of restaurants); 77 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 99 (Feb. 10, 1977) (property record
cards); 76 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 717 (Dec. 2, 1976) (state employee addresses, social securi-
ty numbers exempt); 76 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 568 (Sept. 23, 1976) (individuals transported
by ambulance); 76 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 431 (July 21, 1976) (unpublished opinion on divorce
suit records).
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inspection. 2 Unfortunately, these unofficial reviews have failed
to clarify the exemption standard. A major premise of this Note
is that these opinions of the Office of the Attorney General (OAG)
have added confusion to an already uncertain standard by applying
it in a mechanical, conclusory manner.
The remaining portions of this Note set out a brief introduc-
tion to the privacy balancing test and the Act; a review of the in-
consistencies in the opinions of the Office of the Attorney General;
and finally, an overview of the conflicting interests at stake. Heavy
reliance is placed on legislative history and judicial opinions in-
terpreting section 552(b)(6) of the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA),' 3 which states that section 552 does not apply to "per-
sonnel and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.' 4 In all material aspects, this language is identical to
that of the Kentucky Act.' 5 The OAG opinions and the commen-
tator of the scholarly article mentioned above both cite the
language of the FOIA when interpreting the Kentucky privacy
12 KRS § 61.880(2) (1980).
13 Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966), amended by Act
of November 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat. 1561 (current version at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552 (1976)).
14 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976) (emphasis added).
" The primary difference between the two statutes is that the Kentucky Act's
language applies the exemption to "public records" (see KRS § 61.878(1) (a) (1980)) while
the FOIA privacy exemption applies to "personnel and medical files and similar files."
5 USC § 552(b)(6) (1976). In terms of the scope of documents potentially subject to a privacy
exclusion, Kentucky takes a broader view so as to include any public document. Its federal
counterpart, however, considers only the three mentioned categories of files: medical, per-
sonnel and "similar" files. The result of this narrow federal scope has been a large number
of "similar files" cases in which defendants attempt to analogize certain records to per-
sonnel or medical files. See, e.g., Brown v. FBI, 658 F.2d 71, 75 (2d Cir. 1981) (FBI file
on monetary benefits paid to testifying kidnap victim held similar); Washington Post Co.
v. United States Dep't of State, 647 F.2d 197, 199 (D.C. Cir. 1981), rev'd, 102 S. Ct.
1957 (1982) (citizenship status is information of similar nature); Chamberlain v. Kurtz,
589 F.2d 827, 841-42 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 842 (1979) (IRS memorandum
on disciplinary action against employee ordered to be produced with names and identify-
ing information withheld under the "similar files" exemption); Rural Housing Alliance
v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d 73, 76-77 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (investigatory
housing discrimination report held similar).
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exemption. 6 Both sources also cite federal decisions interpreting
the FOIA. 17
I. THE ROLE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
According to KRS section 61.880(2)-(5),'8 the Attorney
General's office figures prominently in public records disclosure.
The statute requires the OAG to issue a written opinion concern-
ing an agency's denial of inspection within ten days of a
request.' 9 The requestor or the agency may seek injunctive or
declaratory relief in circuit court from an adverse decision.20
Although they are unofficial, these reviews are highly persuasive.
As the OAG has recognized, courts and litigants rely on the OAG's
opinions to determine the legality and practicality of releasing re-
quested records. 2' It is therefore vital that the OAG avoid
mechanical interpretations of the Act which transform the privacy
exemption into a blanket exemption.
A survey of OAG opinions issued during the past six years in-
volving KRS section 61.878(1)(a)22 reveals confusing and incon-
sistent interpretations. Apparently, the initial opinions23 intended
to adopt a balancing test between personal privacy and the public's
right to governmental information. The manner in which the
balancing test was applied in those few opinions, however, has
resulted in defacto blanket exemptions for records containing home
16 See 76 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 717 (quoting Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d
133 (3d Cir. 1974) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6)); Zeigler, supra note 10, at 15 n.61.
17 See 76 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 717 (citing 502 F.2d at 133); Zeigler, supra note 10,
at 15 n.66.
's See KRS § 61.880 (1980).
19 KRS § 61.880(2), (1980).
20 KRS § 61.880(5), (1980).
21 78 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 626.
2 See note 11 supra for a listing of opinions issued during the past six years which
mention the personal privacy exemption.
23 76 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 568 (names of persons transported by ambulance service
are confidential within KRS § 61.878(1)(a)); 76 Ky. Op. At'y. Gen. 717 (social security
numbers and addresses of government employees may properly be withheld under the
personal privacy exemption). See the text accompanying notes 31-59 infra for a detailed
discussion of Opinion 76-717.
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addresses,24 marital status information2 and social security
24 See 76 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 717 ("[l~t is the opinion of the Attorney General that
the home address of a state employee comes within the exemption of the Open Records
Law.. ."). See also 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 469 (citing with approval 76 Ky. Op. Att'y
Gen. 717; 77 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 723 (citing with approval 76 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 717.
The absolute language of the parenthetical quotation implies that the Attorney General
is under the impression that the issue of disclosure of addresses is forever closed, rather
than a case-by-case analysis being required for each requestor's public interest in addresses.
This conclusion is confirmed by Opinion 79-275 which states:
[W]hen we issued OAG 76-717 the State Department of Personnel desired
to maintain a policy that would keep the personnel records of state employees
as private as the Open Records law would permit. We believed then, and
still do, that the home addresses, social security numbers, marital status,
and information on the employment application was not of public concern
and was of such a personal nature that it could be withheld from public
disclosure.
79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 275 (emphasis added). Contra Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670,
675 (D.C. Cir. 1971) ("The giving of names and addresses is a very much lower degree
of disclosure [than files which contain 'intimate details']; in themselves a bare name and
address give no information about an individual which is embarrassing").
25 See 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 275. It is questionable how much weight this opinion's
bald statement of exemption for marital status should be afforded since the issue of marital
status was not before the Attorney General in Opinion 79-275. This off-the-cuff exclusion
highlights the OAG's conclusory approach applied to personal privacy analysis in the ma-
jority of its opinions. See 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 58 ("The results of the examinations are
exempt under KRS 61.878(1)(a) because such information is of a personal nature where
the public disclosure thereof would constitute a dearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy"); 78 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 382 ("It is the opinion of this office that test scores of
individuals applying for jobs within the classified service are matters of a personal nature
within the contemplation of KRS 61.878(a) and are, therefore, exempt from the applica-
tion of the State Public Records Act"); 78 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 133 ("we believe... [KRS
§ 61.878(1)(a) (1980)] applies only to matters entirely unrelated to the performance of
public employment"); 77 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 99 ("This type of [property record] card
probably falls under the provisions of KRS 61.878(1)(a) . . .").
The conclusory parenthetical language does not reveal the underlying reasoning,
and hence raises the danger that opinions will be founded upon undisclosed erroneous
logic, inapposite judicial authority or even personal bias. Opinion 79-348, an unusually
candid opinion, demonstrates that this fear is real. In Opinion 79-348, the editor of a com-
munity college newspaper had requested a review of the applicability of the Act to
documents containing anonymous student evaluations of the college's faculty. In response
to this request, the Attorney General stated:
We question the fairness and value of an anonymous evaluation of a teacher
by a student and do not want to compound the unfairness by saying that
the evaluation should be made public. We believe that to open the results
of such anonymous evaluations to the public would be an unwarranted in-
vasion of personal privacy ....
79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 348 (1979). The speculation concerning fairness has no place in
privacy exemption analysis. How information in a public document is acquired is not rele-
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numbers.2 Later opinions, for the most part, omit even passing
reference to such a test. 27 These reviews simply proclaim that
release of a requested record would or would not be a clearly un-
warranted invasion of personal privacys2 The opinions rendered
between 1976 and 1982 can be broadly categorized into those first
few opinions that attempt, but fail, to apply properly the personal
privacy balancing test,29 and those opinions which do not at-
tempt to apply the test at all.-°
vant to the determination of its status as exempt or nonexempt. See Providence Journal
Co. v. FBI, 460 F. Supp. 778, 786 (D.R.I. 1978), rev'd in part, 602 F.2d (1st Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980). ("No court has withheld disclosure solely on the ground
that the manner in which the information was obtained forbids release"). But see Pro-
vidence Journal Co. v. FBI, 602 F.2d 1010, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S.
1071 (1980) (considering the manner of electronic surveillance used to garner informa-
tion as exempting such information under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C)) (note, however, that
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) was not in issue and that the court recognized the novelty of its
decision).
26 See 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 275.
27 For a listing of conclusory opinions which fail to mention the balancing of interests
required by the privacy exemption, see note 25 supra.
28 See, e.g., 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 58; 78 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 382.
2 See 76 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 568; 76 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 717. See text accompany-
ing notes 31-59 infra for a detailed discussion of Opinion 76-717.
30 See 77 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 394 ("It is the opinion of the Attorney General that
personnel files contain material of a personal nature where the public disclosure thereof
would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy"). For a list of other
opinions ignoring the balancing test, see note 25 supra. The quoted parenthetical language
is the sole, and totally erroneous, explanation of KRS § 61.878(1)(a) (1980) relied upon
to deny a college professor her annual evaluations for 1974-77. First, the sentence reveals
a completely backward concept of the privacy exemption balancing analysis since it is
impossible to determine whether disclosure of a particular file would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy without first determining if a privacy interest
exists. See, e.g., Sins v. CIA, 642 F.2d 562, 573 (D.C. Cir. 1980), vacating and remand-
ing 479 F. Supp. 84 (D.D.C. 1979); Campbell v. United States Civil Service Comm'n,
539 F.2d 58, 61 (10th Cir. 1976); Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d at 136; Rural
Housing Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d at 77; Getman v. NLRB,
450 F.2d at 674; Public Citizen Health Research Group v. HEW, 477 F. Supp. 595, 603
(D.D.C. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 668 F.2d 537 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co. v. Usery, 426 F. Supp. 150, 167 (D.D.C. 1976); Columbia Packing Co. v. United
States Dep't of Agriculture, 417 F. Supp. 651, 654 (D. Mass. 1976), aff'd, 563 F.2d 495
(1st Cir. 1977). The OAG opinion would still be incorrect, even if the sentence were put
in the proper order. Files which contain material of a personal nature create an unwar-
ranted invasion of privacy upon release only if there is no superior public interest in
disclosure. See the cases cited above for this requirement. The most unfortunate aspect
of the quoted language is that it is relied upon in subsequent opinions to deny disclosure
of similar evaluations without considering the possible existence of a public interest at the
time of the new requests. See 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 128.
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A. Opinions Improperly Applying the Balancing Test
The first major misinterpretation appears in Opinion
76-717, 31 issued in December 1976. The Department of Person-
nel had requested an opinion as to whether it was required to pro-
duce a list of names and addresses of state employees sought by
a commercial enterprise. Observing that state employees have a
privacy interest in their home addresses,32 the Assistant Attorney
General turned to Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS33 to recognize
that "the phrase 'a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy' compels a balancing of interests between the right of the
public to know and the right of persons to their privacy." 34
Then, just as the Third Circuit had done in Wine Hobby USA,
the OAG author denied inspection, concluding that releasing the
names and addresses for commercial purposes would be a clearly
unwarranted invasion.-s
So far the opinion is flawless. Factually, Wine Hobby USA
is highly persuasive since it involved a request, for commercial
purposes, of the names and addresses of home wine-makers filed
at the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms.3 The confu-
sion begins with Opinion 76-717's statement that "the Attorney
General believes that a balance of the right of personal privacy
against the public's right to inspect and copy records, prevents
public agencies from providing copies of the records containing
31 76 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 717.
32 Id. ("[a] state employee is entitled to privacy as to his personal life, including his
home address"). This statement, although true, should be the starting point of analysis.
However, all too often the Attorney General equates a privacy interest with exclusion so
that analysis of the public interest in disclosure is foreclosed. See id. ("We have marked
with a check the items we believe may be disclosed to the public and have marked with
an X the items we believe are confidential .... All the [X]... items come within the
exemption of KRS 61.878(1)(a); 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen 128 ("The persons making such
an [annual professor] evaluation are entitled to have their opinions and recommendations
kept confidential"); 77 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 586 ("the records [of motel occupancy and
gross revenue] are made confidential by statute and therefore exempted from the provi-
sions of the [Act] . . .").
33 502 F.2d at 133.
34 76 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 717.
35 Id. Cf. 502 F.2d at 137 ("The disclosure of names of potential customers for com-
mercial business is wholly unrelated to the purpose behind the [FOIA]... and was never
contemplated by Congress in enacting the Act").
36 502 F.2d at 134.
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... home addresses." 37 This broad language suggests that any
agency-not just the Personnel Department-may properly
withhold employee addresses and implies that home addresses
receive a permanent per se exclusion simply because they are
private and no apparent public interest existed when Opinion
76-717 was issued. The logical question then is whether the At-
torney General will disregard the public interests asserted by future
applicants seeking similar information.
Instead of answering the question, however, the opinion only
exacerbates the confusion. The concluding paragraph states that
"[i]n deciding whether a document is exempted under the Act it
is the nature of the document which is controlling and not who
is requesting to inspect the document or for what purpose."'1s
The opinion thus seems to abandon the balancing test described
in Wine Hobby USA.
The first explanation for the confusing language of Opinion
76-717 is that the OAG has in practice adopted Robles v. En-
vironmental Protection Agency. 39 In this decision, the Fourth
37 76 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen 717 (emphasis added).
38 Id. (emphasis added). Other privacy exemption opinions have used similar
language. See, e.g., 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 648 (1979) ("[T]here is no distinction in the
Open Records Law which would allow researchers access to records only for the purpose
of auditing without allowing the obtaining of a copy. A so called researcher has no stand-
ing different from that of the general public. Under the Open Records Law the purpose
of the inspection of a public record is not material to any of the exemptions provided in
KRS 61.878."); 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 275 ("The only material factor in involving an ex-
ception is the nature of the record .... the use to be made of [the requested informa-
tion] ... is of no concern to the licensing board or to the Attorney General.").
Yet, contrary to this policy, the OAG has twice speculated on the possible use of
public records if released. In each case, fears of potential misuse or irrelevant use were
mentioned and disclosure was denied. Opinion 76-568, reviewing the withholding of am-
bulance records, expressed the fear that "[i]f it is published that the person has been taken
to a hospital .... it can ... be misused by certain predatory types such as thieves and
con artists." 76 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 568. In the second opinion, 78-382, the OAG reviewed
the Kentucky Commission on Human Rights' request for merit system examination scores
of certain individuals. 78 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 382. After claiming that such scores fell under
the privacy exemption, the opinion examined the statutory authority by which the Com-
mission could require disclosure. The Attorney General first noted that the statute required
that the documents be relevant to the complaint in order for the Commission to require
disclosure and then added: "[T]his office would be of the initial opinion that test scores
would not be relevant to a complaint based on sex discrimination in light of the personnel
law and rules as we understand them." Id.
39 484 F.2d 843 (4th Cir. 1973).
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Circuit refused to permit the exemption of records containing
radiation level readings in Colorado homes built upon uranium
tailings.4 Addressing the EPA argument that disclosure should
be denied due to negligible public interest, the court responded:
This argument misconceives the plain intent of the Act.
[D]isclosure was never [intended] to "depend upon the interest
or lack of interest of the party seeking disclosure."
[T]he better reasoned authorities find no basis for this bal-
ancing of equities in the application of the Act; indeed, the very
language of the Act seems to preclude its exercise.
41
The court in Robles thus refused to balance interests and instead
looked only at the document's private nature to decide whether
release would be clearly unwarranted. 42
The Attorney General seems to apply Robles in several opin-
ions which simply list certain records as "confidential" and thus
excluded." In fact, Opinion 76-717 lists seven types of questions
which an agency may refuse to answer due to their "confiden-
tial" nature.44 However, the OAG has never cited Robles, al-
though it has recently reaffirmed its reliance on Wine Hobby
USA. 45 Significantly, the United States Supreme Court overruled
Robles sub silentio in Department of the Air Force v. Rose.46 The
40 Id. at 844.
41 Id. at 847.
42 For Attorney General opinions containing "nature of the document" language,
see note 38 supra. Professor Davis' highly respected treatise on administrative law shares
the same view as Robles and is in fact frequently referred to throughout the opinion. Id.
at 845-47 (citing K. DAvis, ADMmISTRATIVE LAW TRFATISE § 3A.4, at 121 (Supp. 1970)).
43 For a listing of OAG opinions equating confidentiality with exclusion, see note
32 supra.
" See 76 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 717.
45 See 81 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 159. It is still uncertain whether this opinion indicates
a rekindled devotion to a clearly reasoned policy of balancing or merely a further step-
ping stone to a per se exemption of library circulation records. If future opinions on library
circulation records (the documents requested in Opinion 81-159) deny disclosure without
analysis of the requestor's public interest; then the OAG has simply continued the confu-
sion which already surrounds the balancing process.
46 425 U.S. 352 (1976), af'g 496 F.2d 261 (2d Cir. 1974). In Rose, two law review
editors sought access to the case summaries of honor and ethics hearings at a military
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Court held there could be no blanket exemption for personnel files
in the face of Congress' desire for "a balancing of the individual's
right of privacy against the preservation of the basic purpose of
the.. .[FOIA] 'to open agency action to the light of public scru-
tiny.' "47
The second, and more probable, explanation for the apparent
confusion in Opinion 76-717 is that the OAG was attempting to
express an unrestricted use policy. During the early seventies,
scholars became enmeshed in a debate centered around Getman
v. NLRB, 48 the first opinion to apply a balancing of interests
under the FOIA. In Getman, two law professors studying union
representation elections acquired from the NLRB a private com-
pany's list of employee names and addresses. 49 In analyzing the
privacy interest, the court concluded that releasing the list would
result in minimal invasion of privacy caused by the professors'
phone solicitations.5o Weighed against this slight inconvenience
was the enormous potential benefit of streamlining NLRB elec-
tion procedures as a result of the professors' NLRB voting
study.5' Deciding to permit disclosure, the court held that its
decision bore an implicit limitation that the released information
be used only for the purpose asserted by the plaintiffs. 52
Critics of Getman 3 urge that since the FOIA explicitly per-
mits public records to be released to "any person,",, meaning
academy. 425 U.S. at 354-56. The district court granted summary judgment for the academy
and the editors appealed. Id. at 352. At the court of appeals, an in camera inspection
of the summaries was ordered along with the deletion of all identifying references. Id.
at 352-53, 358. From that inspection it was determined that the summaries must be disclosed
with all identifying references expunged. Id. at 354.
47 425 U.S. at 372.
48 450 F.2d at 670.
41 Id. at 671-72.
50 Id. at 675.
51 Id.
5
2 Id. at 677 n.24.
5 See e.g., Invasion of Privacy, supra note 10; Note, Privacy, Public Interest and
Judicial Equitable Discretion Within the Freedom of Information Act, 6 U. TOL. L. REv.
215 (1974). See also Hulett, Privacy and the Freedom of Information Act, 27 AD. L. REv.
275, 276-83 (1975); Note, The Plain Meaning of the Freedom of Information Act: NLRB
v. Getman [sic], 47 IND. L.J. 530 (1972).
54 See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976) states: "[E]ach agency, upon any request for
rcords ... shall make the records promptly available to any person." (emphasis added).
The federal statute contains ample evidence that Congress intended public records to be
[Vol. 71
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that a document either must be released to the public-at-large,
irrespective of use, or not be released at all.es The corollary to
this interpretation is that if subsequent use is irrelevant, then the
asserted use for the document also is irrelevant since upon release
it may be used for any purpose. Interestingly, restricted use ad-
vocates counter with Wine Hobby USA footnote fourteen6 and
its statement that it is only nonexempt material that must be made
available to "any person." If the OAG is touting unrestricted
disclosure, reliance on Wine Hobby USA, a restricted use deci-
sion, only multiplies the confusion.
In sum, the test the OAG has arrived at through six years of
opinions is a hybrid of Robles focus on the nature of the docu-
ment and of the unrestricted use view. The public's interest in
government information is conceived to be an abstract right, an
interest divorced from any particular fact situation or plaintiff.
As legal positivists once searched for absolute principles of law,58
released to everyone or no one. The introductory sentence of the FOIA states that "[e]ach
agency shall make available to the public .... 5 U.S.C. § 552(a) (Supp. V 1981) (em-
phasis added). Other subsections of the statute repeat references to the "public" right to
inspection. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (1976) ("Each agency... shall make available for public
inspection . . ."); Id. § 552(a)(5) (1976) ("Each agency having more than one member
shall maintain and make available for public inspection...").
The Kentucky statute apparently takes a similar approach. See, e.g., KRS §
61.872(1) (Supp. 1982) (emphasis added) "[a]U public records shall be open for inspection
by any person); Id. § 61.872(2) (Supp. 1982) "[a]ny person shall have the right to inspect
public records. . ."). This unlimited access policy is a drastic departure for the federal
statute from its predecessor, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) which limited ac-
cess to public records to those persons who could show that they were properly and directly
concerned. See Act of June 11, 1946, ch. 324, § 3(c), 60 Stat. 238 (current version at 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. V. 1981)). See also SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
S For citation to Attorney General opinions containing similar language, see note
38 supra.
6 The court noted:
The Senate Report provides (at 5-6):
[The proposed Act] eliminates the test of who shall have the right to
different information. For the great majority of different records, the public
as a whole has a right to know what its Government is doing. There is of
course, a certain need for confidentiality in some aspects of Government
operations and these are protected specifically; but outside these limited areas,
all citizens have a right to know.
502 F.2d at 136 n.14.
5
7Id.
58 See R. DLus, JURISPRUDENCE 381-85 (3d ed. 1970).
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the Attorney General attempts to discover "the" public interest
in any particular information. Failing this discovery, and apply-
ing the unrestricted use approach, a document containing a privacy
interest is forever excluded from disclosure. Any future questions
which arise about records containing similar information are
quieted with a brief reference to the first opinion's finding of a
lack of public interest, 9 illustrating that the "nature of the docu-
ment" reasoning is being adapted from Robles.
Finally, adoption of such a hybrid test conflicts with legislative
intent implicit in both the Kentucky Act and the FOIA. If such
a test for finding a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy were proper, the Legislature simply could have authorized
the OAG to scrutinize government documents as they were drafted,
excluding from disclosure those for which an absolute public in-
terest could not be theorized. Similarly, if Congress had intended
the FOIA to be so interpreted, federal courts could avoid reanalyz-
ing the public interest in documents involving similar informa-
tion by merely recognizing earlier opinions denying any public
interest in the same record.
B. Opinions Not Applying the Balancing Test
The remaining OAG opinions6° avoid the confusion of the
hybrid balancing test but only because they do no balancing at
all. These later opinions respond to requests for review with
statements such as: "The results of the (test) examinations are
exempt under KRS 61.878(1) (a) because such information is of a
personal nature where the public disclosure thereof would con-
stitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."6' 1
Such a declaration is meaningless. Standing alone the phrase
"clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" is merely con-
clusory.62 Only when it accompanies a subtle interest analysis
does it become significant.
59 See, e.g., 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen 275 (citing 76 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 717 in stating:
"we believed then, and still do, that home addresses, social security numbers, marital status,
and information on the employment application was not of public concern...").
60 See, e.g., 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 275; 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 58; 78 Ky. Op. Att'y
Gen. 473; 78 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 133; 77 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 99.
61 79 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen. 58.
62 The Second Circuit, in deciding Rose v. Department of the Air Force, described
"clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" as "a wholly conclusory phrase, which
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Empty statements such as the one quoted above are akin to
writing the solution to an equation without revealing the equa-
tion. No one benefits from such shorthand; Kentucky circuit courts
have no explanation of the OAG's reasoning on which to render
a decision, litigants have no analysis to criticize or applaud and
future applicants for disclosure of similar records are confronted
with the denial of disclosure without explanation. However, an
examination of decisions under the FOIA provides guidance toward
adoption of a meaningful interpretation of the privacy exemption
in Kentucky.
II. INTERPRETATION OF THE PRIVACY EXEMPTION
UNDER THE FOIA
Although the draftsmanship of the FOIA has been crit-
icized,63 the language of both the FOIA and the Kentucky Act
favors full agency disclosure,6 rather than withholding.6 The
requires a court to apply a statutory standard without any definite guidelines." 495 F.2d
261, 266 (2d Cir. 1974), affd 425 U.S. at 352.
63 See Epstein v. Resor, 421 F.2d 930, 932 (9th Cir. 1970) ("[u]nquestionably the
Act is awkwardly drawn"), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 965 (1970); Davis, The Information
Act: A Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHi. L. REv. 761, 807 (1967) (Act is described as shab-
by product); Kramer & Weinberg, The Freedom of Information Act, 63 GEo. L.J. 49,
52-53 (1974) (FOIA hardly represents the apogee of legislative draftsmanship); Note, The
Freedom of Information Act-The Parameters of the Exemptions, 62 GEO. L.J. 177, 177
(1973) (courts have had to assume responsibility for defining the meaning and applica-
tion of the exemptions because of awkward draftsmanship); Note, The Freedom of Infor-
mation Act: A Critical Review, 38 CEO. WASH. L. REv. 150, 163 (1969) (one cause of the
Act's failure can be traced to vagueness of its language).
64 See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. at 352, 360-61 ("Congress
therefore structured a revision whose basic purpose reflected 'a general philosophy of full
agency disclosure unless information is exempted under clearly delineated statutory
language") (citing SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3).
65 See id. ("The revision [of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (cur-
rent version at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976)] was deemed necessary because'[s]ection 3 was general-
ly recognized as falling far short of its disclosure goals and came to be looked upon more
as a withholding statute than a disclosure statute' ") (citing Environmental Protection Agen-
cy v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973)) (emphasis added). Under the APA, the FOIA
predecessor, only "persons properly and directly concerned" could request information.
Act of June 11, 1946, Pub. L. No. 404, ch. 324, § 3(c), 60 Stat. 237-38. Further, if an
agency refused disclosure, no justification was required. Id. Finally, the APA contained
no judicial remedy for wrongful withholding. H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess.
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thirteen exemptions from disclosure of KRS section 61.878(1)0
and the nine exemptions of 5 U.S.C. section 552(b) (1976)67 are
exclusive.68 However, even where the statute's exemptions app-
ly, the agency may nonetheless exercise its discretion to release
the exempted documents upon request.6
The dominant objective of agency disclosure in the Kentucky
Act and the FOIA may be evident, but the precise legislative in-
tent behind the words "clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy" in both statutes is far from explicit. A definition of the
"clearly unwarranted" invasion does not appear in the text of either
statute. 70 The sparse congressional history of the privacy
exemption 7' at best indicates that it "enunciates a policy that will
involve a balancing of interests between the protection of an in-
dividual's private affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny, and
the preservation of the public's right to governmental informa-
tion." 72 During House and Senate hearings on the bill, legislators
emphasized the importance of interest balancing by refusing gov-
ernment agency recommendations to delete "clearly unwarranted"
and thereby create a blanket exemption prohibiting any invasion
2 (1966) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]. As the Senate Report states:
Innumerable times it appears that information is withheld only to cover up
embarrassing mistakes or irregularities and the withholding justified by such
phrases as-"requiring secrecy in the public interest" or "required for good
cause to be held confidential."
SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 3.
66 KRS § 61.878(1)(a) (1975).
67 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1976).
68 78 Ky. Op. Att'y Gen 382.
69 E.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190, 1197 (4th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 924 (1977) (disclosure of exempt information within discre-
tion of agency); Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute and the Regulations, 56 GEO.
L.J. 18, 28 (1967). See generally Drachsler, The Freedom of Information Act and the
"Right" of Non-disclosure, 28 AD. L. REv. 1 (1976).
70 See Committee on Masonic Homes v. NLRB, 414 F. Supp. 426, 431 (E.D. Pa.
1976) (statute does not define what constitutes a "clearly unwarranted invasion of per-
sonal privacy"), vacated on other grounds, 556 F.2d 214 (3d Cir. 1977).
71 In his extensive review of the FOIA, Professor Davis states: "Even though the
records of the various hearings [on the FOIA] over a ten year period are voluminous, pro-
bably more than ninety-five percent of the useful legislative history is found in a ten page
Senate committee report and in a fourteen page House committee report." K. DAVIS, supra
note 42, at § 3A.2 (footnote omitted).
72 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.
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of privacy. 73 Therefore, while there is confusion as to exactly
what interests are to be balanced,74 Congress' deliberate sugges-
tion is that application of the exemption is relative and contex-
tual, less based upon labels and content than on circumstances. 75
The Kentucky legislature's use of the same "clearly unwarranted"
standard strongly suggests a legislative rejection of a blanket ex-
emption in favor of public and private interests.
A. The Individual's Right to Privacy
Unlike the OAG review opinions,76 developing federal case
law shows that the courts view the right of privacy as varied in
nature, scope and degree. 7 To say that a right of privacy exists
in a particular record is to say only that the starting point of bal-
ancing analysis has been reached. Federal court decisions indicate
that to arrive at that point, the OAG should determine: 1) the
nature of the withheld information; 2) the degree to which that
information is protected; and 3) whether other factors increase
or decrease the magnitude of that protection.
1. The Nature of Private Information
Neither the House nor Senate reports on 5 U.S.C. section
552(b)(6) define the "right of privacy." 78 Reading both reports
73 See Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d at 674 n.11.
74 See Disabled Officers Ass'n v. Rumsfeld, 428 F. Supp. 454, 457 (D.D.C. 1977)
(uncertainty exists as to what private and public interests must'be balanced).
75 See Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 460 F. Supp. at 786, rev'd in part, 602 F.2d
1010 (1st Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1071 (1980).
76 See note 60 supra for a list of opinions not applying any balancing test.
77 See notes 78-110 infra and accompanying text for an extended discussion of federal
case law and the differing aspects of personal privacy.
78 H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); SENATE REPORT, supra note 8.
In the legal community, the four categories of privacy tort created by Professor Prosser
have received wide acceptance in traditional tort settings. Prosser's four categories are:
1) appropriating a person's name or picture for commercial purposes, 2) intruding, 3) public-
ly disclosing private facts, and 4) casting a person in a false light through disclosures made
out of context. Placed in the context of the FOIA, however, the categories fail to describe
adequately the unique problems associated with invasion of privacy by the government.
See A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 169-209 (1971) (discussing the applicability of
the four tort privacy theories to computerized record keeping, including government files);
Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REv. 971,
1231-42 (1974-75) (criticizing Professor Prosser's categories in the area of government files).
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together suggests only that Congress wished to protect records con-
taining "vast amounts of personal data"79 "which can be identi-
fied as applying to. .. an individual"8  where "disclosure
.. . might harm an individual." 81 The federal courts have de-
scribed privacy largely in terms of the content of information, fre-
quently using the phrase "intimate details of a highly personal
nature."82
Decisions involving the "similar files" language of the FOIA
privacy exemption" are of special help in defining the nature of
private information since "a finding that the requested informa-
tion is similar to that contained in personnel or medical files,
[within 5 U.S.C. section 552(b) (6)] necessarily implies a substan-
tial privacy interest that must be overcome before disclosure is
warranted."' The long lists of private information found in these
It has therefore become the court's responsibility to examine privacy on a case-by-case
basis looking more at the qualities of private information than relying upon a stock defini-
tion. See Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 460 F. Supp. at 784 ("The case law has defined
the 'privacy' which FOIA protects largely in terms of the content of information and has
tried to demarcate those informational topics which are deeply private from those which
are only minimally private"). See also O'Brien, Privacy and the Right of Access: The Pur-
pose and Paradox of Information Control, 30 AD. L. REv. 45, 65-75 (1978), which con-
tains a lengthy and well reasoned investigation of the qualities of different definitions of
privacy adopted by various groups of professionals.
79 SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.
80 H.R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) reprinted in 1966 U.S. CODE
CoNc. & AD. NEWS 2418, 2428.
81 Id.
82 Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d 166, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
83 See, e.g., Brown v. FBI, 658 F.2d at 75 ("There is, to a large extent, an essential
interrelationship between the question whether information to which access is denied under
the aegis of Exemption 6 is 'similar' to personnel or medical files, and the inquiry whether
disclosure of information would result in an unwarranted invasion of privacy...");
Washington Post Co. v. United States Dep't of State, 647 F.2d at 198-99 ("to qualify as
'similar' files, the recorded data must incorporate 'intimate details' about an individual,
information 'of the same magnitude-as highly personal or as intimate in nature-as that
at stake in personnel and medical records"'). See also Sims v. CIA, 642 F.2d at 574-75;
Harboldt v. Department of State, 616 F.2d 772, 774 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449
U.S. 856 (1980); Ditlow v. Shultz, 517 F.2d 166, 169 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Wine Hobby USA,
Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d at 135; Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture,
498 F.2d at 76-77.
84 Brown v. FBI, 658 F.2d at 75.
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decisions reveal that familial, medicalas financial87 and occupa-
tionals data are four "core"89 types of information which nor-
mally are recognized as being private information entitled to possi-
ble protection. For example, the early and frequently cited deci-
sion discussing familial privacy is Rural Housing Alliance v. United
States Department of Agriculture.9 In this decision, the court
refused to mandate disclosure of a housing discrimination report,
noting that "information regarding marital status, legitimacy of
children, identity of fathers of children, ... welfare payments,
alcoholic consumption, family fights ... involves sufficiently
similar details to be (afforded protection as) a 'similar
file'...."91 A representative decision involving medical data as
private information is Public Citizen Health Research Group v.
HEW.92 Although it permitted disclosure of aggregate health
8 See Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d at 77.
8 See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. HEW, 477 F. Supp. at 603-05. See
also Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 471 F. Supp. 1023, 1027
n.5 (D.D.C. 1979) (containing a lengthy listing of documents considered medical files).
87 See Gregory v. FDIC, 470 F. Supp. 1329, 1335 (D.D.C. 1979) (citing Consumers
Union v. Heimann, 589 F.2d 531, 534 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1978)). See also Deering Milliken,
Inc. v. Irving, 548 F.2d at 1131; Luzaich v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 31 (D. Minn.
1977); Sonderegger v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 424 F. Supp. 847, 852-56 (D.
Idaho 1976).
88 See Campbell v. United States Civil Service Comm'n, 539 F.2d at 62. See also
Celmins v. United States Department of Treasury, 457 F. Supp. 13, 15 (D.D.C. 1977)
("the evaluation of an individual's work performance, even if favorable, is personal in-
formation and its release is an invasion of privacy"); Duncan v. United States Civil Ser-
vice Comm'n, 426 F. Supp. 41 (E.D. La. 1976); Vaughn v. Rosen, 383 F. Supp. 1049
(D.D.C. 1974), a[f'd on other grounds, 523 F.2d 1136 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Washington
Research Project, Inc. v. HEW, 366 F. Supp. 929, 937 (D.D.C. 1973), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 504 F.2d 238 (D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
89 The term "core," as a qualification of highly private information, first appears
in Information Acquisition Corp. v. Department of Justice, 444 F. Supp. 458, 464 (D.D.C.
1978). As used in that case, "core" personal information is that information which is so
highly private that its release would normally be an unwarranted invasion of privacy.
Id. at 464. Cited as specific examples of such information are marital status and college
grades. Id. Note, however, that release will not always constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion. There may still be sufficiently substantial public interests to require disclosure
even in the face of a core privacy interest. Too often the Kentucky Attorney General has
failed to continue his analysis after finding a "core" privacy interest by examining the
public interest in disclosure. See note 32, supra for citation to Attorney General opinions
equating confidentiality with exemption.
90 498 F.2d at 73.
91 Id. at 77.
92 477 F. Supp. at 595.
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care statistics, the court found that the confidential relationship
between physician and patient as contained in the "intimate details
of an individual's medical file"93 creates a substantial interest in
nondisclosure. Indeed, the court considered protection of such files
a "central goal of the privacy exemption." As for the financial
privacy category, Gregory v. FDIC95 highlighted the vital pri-
vacy interest in banking financial records with its comment that
"[t]he release of personal information such as the size of one's loans,.
his assets, or the collateral put up for a loan would constitute a
clearly unwarranted invasion of an individual's privacy."6 Final-
ly, in the occupational information category, Campbell v. United
States Civil Service Commission 7 denied federal employees ac-
cess to a personnel management study of their agency. The court
reasoned that disclosing matters such as an individual's job
classification, salary and information as to overclassification and
promotion contrary to regulations would be a serious invasion of
privacy.9" When the requested information falls outside these
four categories, the courts and the OAG must consider the intimacy
of the information, the identification of individuals, and the poten-
tial harm if disclosed to guide them in their search for a privacy
interest.
2. The Degree of Protection Afforded Private Information
The magnitude of a privacy interest is just as important as the
recognition of the interest itself, since a substantial privacy interest
will be overcome only by a greater public interest. In effect, deter-
mining the magnitude of the privacy interest is the second, or mid-
dle, step in the three step balancing of interests process. First, the
court determines the existence of a privacy interest. Then it con-
siders how substantial the interest may be. Finally, it determines
93 Id. at 603. The court in Public Citizen suggests the type of harm resulting from
disclosure of medical records when it comments that "[d]isclosure of a physician's identi-
ty does nothing to intrude on his confidential relationship with patients, nor does it restrict
the exercise of his professional medical judgment." Id. at 605 (emphasis added).
94 Id. at 603.
95 470 F. Supp. at 1329.
96 Id. at 1335.
97 539 F.2d at 58.
98 Id. at 62.
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whether a public interest in government information exists in the
circumstances of the case that is sufficiently important to war-
rant the invasion of privacy resulting from disclosure.
Federal decisions have not been explicit in calibrating possi-
ble levels of privacy associated with various documents or
information. 9 The district courts tend roughly to gauge the im-
portance of protecting an individual's privacy by hypothesizing
the adverse effects of disclosure. These opinions most often men-
tion harassment, life-long embarrassment, disgrace, loss of friends
and loss of employment as significant harmful effects to be
avoided. 10 The weight given one or more of these harmful ef-
fects can vary according to the unique characteristics of the in-
dividuals affected. For example, in Rushford v. Civiletti,0' the
reputation of federal judges was considered to be their fundamental
asset which would be seriously jeopardized by the release of in-
formation that certain judges had been investigated.102 However,
the same sort of argument was rejected in Public Citizen Health
in regard to the professional reputation of physicians.1°3
Courts will find a privacy interest insubstantial unless there
is evidence that potential harm is likely to result from disclosure.
In Public Citizen Health, the court was not persuaded by the defen-
dant agency's argument that disclosure of records reporting the
quality of Medicaid services would diminish physician participa-
tion in such public health programs since no evidence was
presented to that effect.104 Therefore, the court must consider the
likelihood that harm will result from disclosure as well as the nature
of the harm to determine the magnitude of a recognized privacy
interest.
99 As demonstrated by the decision in Providence Journal Co. v. FBI, 460 F. Supp.
at 784-86, the decisions do not tend toward a highly structured analysis of privacy in-
terests. They tend instead to simply rank privacy interests as either high or low without
setting out a middle ground.
1OO See, e.g., Schonberger v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 508 F. Supp. 941, 943
(D.D.C. 1981); Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 471 F. Supp.
at 1028.
101 485 F. Supp. 477 (D.D.C. 1980).
102 Id. at 479.
103 477 F. Supp. at 603.
104 Id. at 604-05.
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3. Other Factors which Increase or Decrease the
Magnitude of Privacy Protection
Courts have considered two other factors as affecting the
weight given privacy interests. First, there has been some judicial
discussion that a public agency's promise of confidentiality to a
person submitting information should be weighed on the side of
withholding. The court in Robles stated: "A promise of confiden-
tiality is a factor to be considered, [although] it is not enough to
defeat the right of disclosure ... .,,.0 However, many courts re-
main uncertain whether this promise should be considered.36
Several courts also have considered the availability of infor-
mation from other sources in deciding whether a plaintiff has an
acute need for the requested files. 107 While the OAG has stead-
fastly refused to consider the special circumstances of any given
applicant for public records,"" the federal courts have not.
Representative of these decisions" 9 is Getman, in which the court
specifically considered availability, stating that "[i]n striking the
balance necessary to determine whether disclosure ... would con-
stitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy, it is
also significant that ... [the] appellees have no other source ob-
taining the [requested information]." 0
Although the Attorney General might not consider either of
these two factors,"' Kentucky courts are not bound by the policy
'05 484 F.2d at 846.
106 See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d at 1196 n.5; Charles
River Park "A", Inc. v. HUD, 519 F.2d 935, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Ditlow v. Schultz,
517 F.2d at 172; Petkas v. Staats, 501 F.2d 887, 889-90 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Sonderegger
v. United States Dep't of the Interior, 424 F. Supp. at 853.
107 See, e.g., Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d at 677; Disabled Officers Ass'n v.
Rumsfeld, 428 F. Supp. at 458-59.
108 See note 38 supra for a listing of OAG opinions which refuse to consider the cir-
cumstances or need of the individual requesting disclosure.
1"9 See, e.g., Rural Housing Alliance v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 498 F.2d
at 77 (Rural Housing is somewhat unique in that it actually includes a consideration of
alternate sources in its formal statement of the balancing test); Rushford v. Civiletti, 485
F. Supp. at 479 (the defendant agency argued that the objectives of the plaintiff jour-
nalist could be satisfied by other means, implying that the plaintiff journalist had no need
for the requested information); Celmins v. IRS, 457 F. Supp. at 16 ("It is also important
to note that the data from these documents cannot be retrieved from any other source..
"0 450 F.2d at 676-77.
I" The Attorney General's office has weighed a promise of confidentiality in favor
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of unofficial review opinions. In view of the abbreviated analysis
that the privacy exemption has received from the OAG, refusing
to consider these additional determinants would seem shortsighted.
B. The Public Interest in Government Information
The privacy exemption of the Kentucky Act and the FOIA
prevents only clearly unwarranted invasions of personal privacy,
thus signaling that federal and state legislators wil tolerate an in-
vasion of privacy for the greater benefit of the public.112 The
congressional motive behind this toleration was the abolition of
agency secrecy." 3 Therefore, the public's right to know is limited
to the right of discovering government information"-f acts
relating directly or indirectly to the performance, policy and prac-
tice of public agencies and their employees. If not such interest
exists, or, if it exists, but is of minor significance, there should be
no disclosure. 115 Neither the Act nor the FOIA was "intended to
be an administrative discovery statute for the benefit of private
parties."1
6
The court in Brown v. FBIu 7 expressed the same thought,
stating that "it is the interest of the general public, and not that
of the private litigant, that must be considered."118 This general
concept, the exclusive "public" interest in government informa-
tion, lies at the core of the confusion created by the unrestricted
use aspect of the Attorney General's hybrid test." 9 The OAG
of withholding public records in at least one request for disclosure. In Opinion 79-648,
an opinion was requested by the Coordinator of the Kentucky Historical Society concern-
ing the propriety of selling duplicate tapes of oral history interviews. 79 Ky. Op. Att'y
Gen. 648. The Attorney General reminded the Coordinator that in an earlier opinion,
76-419, he had stated that the Oral History Commission could withhold the tapes if the
oral interview had been given under stipulation that the tapes would be treated in a par-
ticular manner, including refusing access to the public. Id. See 76 Ky. Op. At'y Gen. 419.
112 See generally Information Acquisition Corp. v. Department of Justice, 444 F.
Supp. at 464.
11 See Department of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. at 378.
114 See SENATE REPORT, supra note 8, at 9.
115 See 444 F. Supp. at 464.
116 Columbia Packing Co. v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 417 F. Supp. at 655.
"17 658 F.2d at 71.
118 Id. at 75.
119 See text accompanying notes 57-59 supra for an explanation of the hybrid bal-
ancing test and the confusion it has created.
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seems to believe that information should not be released to a par-
ticular person for a specific purpose. Instead, it views the public
nature of the interest as requiring information to be released, if
at all, to all persons for any purpose. Thus, the OAG ignores the
circumstances of individual requestors and engages in quixotic
searches for "the" public interest in government data.
However, a specific person's particular need for the release
of public records should routinely receive consideration. Only after
the OAG decides that a facially private purpose does not directly
or indirectly advance a broader public purpose should it find that
no public interest exists. The absence of a public interest in one
situation should not establish precedent to deny disclosure in
another, except in the unlikely event that the later requestor seeks
identical information for an identical purpose. 12
The federal courts which have accepted the unrestricted use
prerequisite for disclosed information'2' regularly examine each
plaintiffs asserted purpose for requesting public records, unlike
the Kentucky Attorney General. Columbia Packing Company v.
United States Department of Agriculture'2 is an excellent exam-
ple. In Columbia, a meat packing company charged with brib-
ing two federal meat inspectors sought disclosure of the inspec-
tors' personnel records to assist in its defense. 123 After determin-
ing that the two inspectors' privacy interests were diminished by
120 Compare Getman v. NLBB, 450 F.2d at 670 with Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS,
502 F.2d at 136. Both cases involved a request for names and addresses of persons kept
on file by a public agency. In Getman, the requestors successfully sought the informa-
tion, asserting the improvement of NLRB election procedures as the public interest their
request encompassed. 450 F.2d at 675. In Wine Hobby USA, the requestor's sole motive
was commercial solicitation; thus, its request was denied. 502 F.2d at 137. If the court
took the approach to balancing that the OAG now takes, and that the decisions were
switched with Wine Hobby USA decided first, the court in Getman would have reached
the opposite result, since the court would merely have cited to Wine Hobby USA and sum-
marily denied disclosure. This is the way the OAG cites to previous opinions to deny
disclosure in subsequent ones without considering the possible different public interests
in disclosure.
121 See, e.g., Brown v. FBI, 658 F.2d at 75; Schonberger v. National Transp. Safe-
ty Bd., 508 F. Supp. at 942-43; Columbia Packing Co. v. United States Dep't of Agriculture,
417 F. Supp. at 654.
12 417 F. Supp. at 651.
123 Id. at 653.
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their participation in illegal activities, 24 the court turned to the
public interest in disclosure, stating:
Initially, the public interest purposes asserted by Columbia
do not appear very weighty. Columbia seeks the records to assist
its defense in the administrative proceedings, i.e., to advance
its own private interests, not the public interest .... However,
certain public interest purposes appear which are advanced,
directly or indirectly, by the plaintiff here. First, there is a public
interest in the availability of an adequate supply of wholesome
meat and poultry .... There is the broader public interest in
correct adjudication of administrative proceedings.... Finally,
the public has an interest in whether public servants carry out
their duties in an efficient and law abiding manner. 2  .
Other federal court decisions have considered as public interests
such unique interests as: enhancing consumer choice among physi-
cians rendering medicare services; 12 improving the accountabili-
ty of private individuals paid in large part from government
funds; 127 assessing employment discrimination;'2 ensuring fair
adherence to government merit promotion procedures; l' 9 and
monitoring government agency operations. 130
Among the public interests discussed above, one common
public interest stands out-the public interest in ensuring honest
and efficient government.' 3 ' The OAG should afford the highest
deference to this interest, for "where government wrongdoing is
in issue there is a special interest in complete, not partial, disclosure
because of the 'beneficial effect upon public confidence of know-
ing nothing of possible relevance is being suppressed."'132 Protec-
tion of this interest resulted in the release of private letters to a
1' Id. at 655.
12 5 Id.
12 Public Citizen Health Research Group v. HEW, 477 F. Supp. at 604.
127 August v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 425 F. Supp. 946, 951 (D.D.C. 1976).
128 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Servs. Admin., 402 F. Supp. 378, 385 (D.D.C.
1975), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 826 (1977).
129 Clemins v. IRS, 457 F. Supp. at 16.
130 Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. United States Dep't of Labor, 471 F. Supp. at
1029.




parole board in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. United States
Department of Justice'," and in the disclosure of a list of unre-
ported contributors involved in the Nixon Townhouse oper-
ation.'13 Where charges of wrongdoing are unsubstantiated,
however, the courts are less willing to disclose the identity of in-
nocent suspects.' 15
The lowest degree of interest, in fact no interest at all, is found
in purely commercial uses for government information.13 Seek-
ing information in order to solicit for customers, for example, is
a purely private interest. Requesting public data to initiate or assist
in personal litigation is another. Unaccompanied by a public in-
terest, these private purposes can never require disclosure.
In summary, then, the majority of federal decisions (other than
Robles) have not adopted the cursory approach to determining
public interest taken by the Kentucky Attorney General.
CONCLUSION
In all fairness to the Office of the Attorney General, the pre-
sent system is not well suited to discerning an individual plain-
tiffs purposes for disclosure. These persons probably do not in-
clude detailed descriptions of their asserted public interest in their
requests for review. 137 Nevertheless, the OAG cannot continue to
look only at the nature of the document while philosophizing upon
a metaphysical public interest. This hybrid balancing of the privacy
interest and the.public interest in government information is in-
defensible. The result of such misconstruction of the Kentucky
Open Records Act has been a confusing heritage of blanket exemp-
133 405 F. Supp. 8, 11 (E.D. Pa. 1975).
134 Congressional News Syndicate v. United States Dep't of Justice, 438 F. Supp.
538, 544 (D.D.C. 1977).
135 See Rushford v. Civiletti, 485 F. Supp. at 479. The court stated: "There can be
no question but that [the reputation of the judiciary] ... would be in serious jeopardy
by release of information that a great many judges have been subjected to a great many
investigations, however unfounded the particular complaints may have turned out to be."
Id.
136 Wine Hobby USA, Inc. v. IRS, 502 F.2d at 137.
137 The lack of specificity in requests for review could be remedied by requiring fur-
ther information from the requestor in order to evaluate properly the public's interest as
it exists in the particular situation.
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tions under the "clearly unwarranted" invasion of privacy excep-
tion to disclosure. This misconstruction conflicts with interpreta-
tion of the same language in the privacy exemption of the FOIA.
Unfortunately, during the past six years we apparently have strayed
from the sunshine of full disclosure of public records into the
shadows of unnecessary withholding. It is time to return.
Jerome E. Wallace

